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1Introduction
Few works of philosophy can rival Leibniz’s Monadology in terms of 
sweep: it begins with an account of the most basic substances, monads, and 
ends with God’s intimate relation to the most exalted of these substances, 
namely minds, and in between it covers (among other things) the natures 
of perception, sensation, and thought, the principles of reasoning, the 
existence and nature of God, the creation of the best possible world, and 
the organic structure of bodies. In covering all of this ground, and more, 
not only does the Monadology seek to present many of the key elements of 
Leibniz’s mature philosophy and mount a defence of them, it does so in the 
space of ninety short sections, amounting to approximately 6,000 words. 
It is difficult not be struck by both its scope and its size, and in particular 
the apparent disparity between the two. In the entire history of philosophy 
there is little else like it. Great philosophers, as a rule, have sought to 
present their thought to the public through the medium of books, often 
ones of great length: think of Plato’s Republic, Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. Among the great philosophers 
Leibniz is the most notable exception to this rule, if not the only one; 
indeed, many of Leibniz’s most enduring and well-known philosophical 
writings, such as the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), New System (1695), 
Monadology (1714), and Principles of Nature and Grace (1714) are about as 
long as an average journal article or book chapter. While Leibniz did write 
book-length works of philosophy, he was not a natural book writer, and 
preferred to capture and disseminate his thought via shorter writings. To 
understand why this should be, we need to acquaint ourselves with some 
of the details of Leibniz’s life.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig on 1 July 1646 to 
Catherine Schmuck and Frederick Leibniz, professor of moral  philosophy 
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at the University of Leipzig. Leibniz claimed to be largely self-taught, and 
his thirst for learning was such that he supplemented his formal school-
ing by withdrawing himself into his father’s study to read the classical 
authors. These became so familiar to him that even in later life he was 
said to be able to recite the poems of Virgil from memory. He entered 
the University of Leipzig at the age of fifteen, and obtained the degree 
of Bachelor of Philosophy in 1663, at the age of seventeen, and a Masters 
degree a year later. Thereafter Leibniz engaged in several years of legal 
studies, his efforts eventually culminating in a dissertation, ‘On difficult 
cases in the law’, for which he was awarded a Doctorate in Law from the 
University of Altdorf in 1667.1 After turning down the offer of a profes-
sorship at the University of Jena, Leibniz accepted a post working for 
the Elector of Mainz, working on legal reform. In 1672, in an attempt 
to divert war between France and the Netherlands, Leibniz wrote a 
lengthy memoire recommending that the King of France, Louis XIV, 
commit himself instead to an invasion of Egypt, presenting the plan as a 
seventeenth-century crusade against the Turks.2 The Elector despatched 
Leibniz to Paris to promote the plan in person to the French court, but 
his efforts were unsuccessful. Due to the opportunities afforded by what 
was at the time the intellectual capital of Europe, Leibniz chose to remain 
in Paris for almost four years. There he met Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas 
Malebranche, two of Europe’s greatest philosophers at the time, as well as 
mathematician-physicist Christiaan Huygens. Under Huygens’ tutelage, 
Leibniz devoted himself to an intensive study of mathematics, which led 
him to the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus in 1675, though this 
was not made public until 1684. In late 1676 Leibniz accepted a post 
as Court Councillor at Hanover, the capital town of the principality of 
Brunswick-Lüneburg in northern Germany, which brought his time in 
France to an end. Leibniz’s route back to Germany was not a straight-
forward one, however, and involved stops in England, to visit the Royal 
Society, which later elected him a fellow, and the Netherlands, where he 
sought out Spinoza, already well known as a philosopher, and Antony van 
Leeuwenhoek, one of the first microscopists.
In Hanover, Leibniz was initially appointed a Court Councillor, 
though his duties were various. He served as librarian, political advisor, 
 1 An English translation of Leibniz’s dissertation can be found in G. W. Leibniz, Logico-
Philosophical Puzzles in the Law, trans. and ed. Alberto Artosi, Bernardo Pieri, and 
Giovanni Sartor (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).
 2 An English translation of parts of this document can be found in A Summary Account 
of Leibnitz’s Memoir Addressed to Lewis the Fourteenth, Recommending to that Monarch, 
the Conquest of Egypt as Conducive to the Establishing a Supreme Authority Over the 
Governments of Europe (London, 1803).
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technical consultant, and even as unofficial diplomat. At his own sugges-
tion, in 1686 he was given the task of writing a history of the House of 
Guelph (or Welf) in order to enhance his employer’s dynastic ambitions. 
Leibniz initially hoped that the history could be completed relatively 
quickly, within a couple of years, but it soon got away from him: despite 
a great deal of research in various European archives, which enabled 
Leibniz to unearth and publish many volumes of ancient documents 
pertaining to the Guelph line, he was unable to complete the history itself 
in the remaining thirty years of his life. As the years wore on, the project 
became a millstone around Leibniz’s neck, and he frequently complained 
that it kept him from other projects that were much closer to his heart. Yet 
he did still find time for such projects. He was tenacious in his efforts to 
facilitate a reunion between the Catholic and Protestant churches, and – 
later – a reunion of the various Protestant sects. He lobbied tirelessly 
for the establishment of scientific academies, and in 1700 was rewarded 
for his efforts with the foundation of the Berlin Academy of Sciences 
(of which Leibniz was subsequently made president for life). He created 
calculating machines, drew up plans for the development of a universal 
encyclopaedia that would contain everything that was so far known, wrote 
Latin poetry, funded alchemical research, and undertook studies on the 
origin of languages. That Leibniz managed to find the time for such an 
astonishing number and range of intellectual projects may in part be 
due to his not having the demands of family life (he never married, but 
was said – by some of his earliest biographers at least – to have fathered 
a son in his youth).3 More importantly than that, however, was his own 
industry, which was legendary even in his own time. According to an early 
biographer, ‘He frequently spent a great part of the night, as well as the 
day, in reading; and has been known to pass whole months in his study 
without allowing himself any unnecessary avocations.’4 This devotion 
to research enabled Leibniz to become eminent in many fields of study: 
during his lifetime he made original contributions to physics, mathemat-
ics, logic, geology, law, politics, economics, and linguistics, as well as 
philosophy. The final years of Leibniz’s life were mostly spent working on 
the never-to-be-completed history of the Guelph House, and attempting 
to popularise his philosophical views through papers circulated to well-
placed acquaintances and ‘popular’ writings for the educated public, the 
most notable of which was the Theodicy (1710). Following a short illness, 
he died in Hanover on 14 November 1716 at the age of seventy.
 3 See Benjamin Martin, Biographia philosophica (London, 1764), p. 389.
 4 Johann Brucker, The History of Philosophy, 2 vols (Dublin, 1792), II, p. 560.
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As should be clear from this brief history, philosophy was never Leibniz’s 
official profession. Consequently, his philosophising (along with his other 
intellectual endeavours) had to be carried out in his spare time, around his 
official duties. This no doubt goes some way towards explaining Leibniz’s 
fondness for writing short papers: his work duties did not afford him the 
time to produce a whole suite of books. But pressures of time aside, by his 
own confession, he simply did not have the inclination to write a lengthy 
treatise that brought all the parts of his philosophical system together: the 
lengthy philosophical works that he did eventually find the time to write, 
namely the New Essays on Human Understanding (written 1703–5 though 
not published until 1765) and the aforementioned Theodicy (1710), were not 
expositions of his system as such, but rather detailed responses to the work 
of John Locke and Pierre Bayle respectively, and intended as correctives to 
what Leibniz considered to be the errors in their work.
Without the time or inclination to lay out his philosophy in books, 
Leibniz instead took full advantage of alternative means of circulating 
and publicising his ideas, in particular the letter and the journal article. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was common for thinkers 
to communicate their ideas to others via letters, which were at the time 
semi-public documents that were often copied and distributed to other 
scholars, or even published (with or without the writer’s permission), and 
Leibniz often disseminated his philosophical ideas this way. To facilitate 
this, he built up a vast network of correspondents, which reads as a ‘who’s 
who’ of early modern philosophy: Thomas Hobbes, Nicolas Malebranche, 
Antoine Arnauld, Christian Wolff, Pierre Bayle, Bernard le Bovier de 
Fontenelle, and Samuel Clarke, to name just a few. Leibniz’s philosophical 
correspondence fills many volumes, and is so rich in its content that no 
serious student of Leibniz can afford to ignore it.
In addition to letters, Leibniz also sought to promulgate his ideas 
through short articles in learned journals. That he was one of the first 
of the great philosophers to publish this way is not surprising, since the 
learned journal first emerged in Leibniz’s lifetime, with the first two 
European journals, the Journal des sçavans of France, and the Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of England, both appearing in 1665, 
when Leibniz was still at university. This gave Leibniz the opportunity 
to disseminate his ideas in a way that had not been available to earlier 
philosophers. So keen was Leibniz on the very idea of the learned journal 
that he proposed the establishment of one in Germany. Although his own 
plans did not come to fruition, a German journal – entitled Acta eruditorum 
(Chronicles of the Learned) – was nevertheless established in 1682 by two 
of his university friends. Leibniz supported the journal by filling its pages 
with a number of important papers, including ‘A new method for maxima 
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and minima’,5 which made public his discovery of infinitesimal calcu-
lus. Leibniz also put his weight behind another journal, the Miscellanea 
Berolinensia (Miscellaneous matters from Berlin), which was the journal of 
the Berlin Academy of Sciences: its first volume, published in 1710, con-
tained no fewer than twelve articles authored by Leibniz. Over the course of 
his career Leibniz published well over a hundred articles, on a kaleidoscope 
of subjects: in addition to papers detailing his mathematical discoveries and 
philosophical views, he published articles about the accuracy of watches,6 
the separation of salt and water,7 the health records of Paris,8 the discovery 
of phosphorous,9 the cause of the aurora borealis,10 and many other topics 
besides. Leibniz fully embraced the format of the journal article: it suited his 
working patterns, and preference for short, punchy pieces rather than long, 
bloated ones. Such was Leibniz’s fondness for the short paper that when he 
did eventually decide to write an account of his philosophical system, it was 
almost inevitable that he would choose to do so as a short paper rather than 
as a book. Despite the challenges presented by the restricted length, it was 
the format with which Leibniz was most comfortable.
THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF THE MONADOLOGY
Yet although the Monadology has the look and feel of a journal article, it 
was not written for a journal at all, but apparently for one of Leibniz’s cor-
respondents, Nicole Remond, councillor to the Duke of Orleans. It may 
have been intended simply to give Remond greater insight into Leibniz’s 
philosophy, or it may have had a more exotic purpose, to serve as a frame-
work for a Latin poem about Leibniz’s philosophy that Abbé Fraguier, one 
of Remond’s acquaintances in Paris, wished to write. These two possible 
aims are suggested by two apparently unrelated threads that run through 
some of Leibniz’s correspondence in the first half of 1714, while he was 
stationed in Vienna. The beginnings of the first thread are to be found in 
 5 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis’, Acta eruditorum 3 (1684), 
pp. 467–73.
 6 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Extrait d’une lettre de Mr Leibniz à l’auteur du Journal, touchant le 
principe de justesse des horloges portatives de son invention’, Journal des sçavans (1675), 
pp. 93–6.
 7 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Meditatio de separatione salis & aqua dultis, novoque separationum 
chymicarum genere’, Acta eruditorum 1 (1682), pp. 386–8.
 8 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Extrait d’une letter de Mr Leibnitz’, Journal des sçavans (1694), 
pp. 338–40.
 9 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Historia inventionis phosphori’, Miscellanea Berolinensia 1 (1710), 
pp. 91–8.
10 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Annotatio de luce quam quidam auroram borealem vocant’, Miscellanea 
Berolinensia 1 (1710), pp. 137–8.
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Leibniz’s letter to Remond of 10 January 1714. Leibniz there explains his 
approach to philosophy, and offers a very brief (and possibly apocryphal) 
account of his philosophical development:
I have tried to uncover and unite the truth buried and scattered in the opin-
ions of different philosophical sects, and I believe I have added something of 
my own to take a few steps forward. The circumstances of my studies, from 
my earliest youth, have given me some facility in this. I learned Aristotle as 
a lad, and even the Scholastics did not put me off; I am not at all regretful of 
this even now. But at that time Plato too, and Plotinus, gave me some satis-
faction, not to mention other ancient thinkers whom I consulted later. After 
leaving the trivial schools, I fell upon the moderns, and I remember at the age 
of fifteen taking a walk by myself in a grove on the outskirts of Leipzig, called 
the Rosental, in order to deliberate about whether I should retain substantial 
forms. Mechanism finally prevailed and led me to apply myself to mathemat-
ics. It is true that I did not enter into its depths until after I had conversed with 
Mr Huygens in Paris. But when I looked for the ultimate reasons for mecha-
nism, and for the laws of motion themselves, I was very surprised to see that it 
was impossible to find them in mathematics, and that I should have to return to 
metaphysics. This is what led me back to entelechies, and from the material to 
the formal, and ultimately brought me to understand, after a number of correc-
tions and improvements to my notions, that monads, or simple substances, are 
the only true substances, and that material things are only phenomena, albeit 
well-founded and well-connected.11
Remond’s curiosity was piqued by Leibniz’s talk of monads (at the 
time, references to monads in Leibniz’s published works were few and 
far between),12 and on 11 February 1714, Charles Hugony, a mutual 
acquaintance of both Leibniz and Remond, wrote to Leibniz explain-
ing that Remond would like some clarification of Leibniz’s doctrine of 
monads. In his (undated) response, Leibniz advised Hugony that he 
would need more detail about what exactly Remond wanted clarified, 
explaining that ‘To provide clarifications on monads, I would need 
difficulties raised about them, in order not to speak aimlessly and to 
say anything other than what is asked for.’13 In his reply to Leibniz of 
17 April 1714, Hugony wrote: ‘Before raising difficulties about monads, I 
would like to have a greater knowledge of your system. This is exercising 
Mr Remond.’ Presumably with his tongue firmly in his cheek, Hugony 
then proceeded to spell out just how exercised Remond was by not having 
sufficient knowledge of Leibniz’s system: ‘You are endangering his health, 
11 PPL, pp. 654–5 (translation modified).
12 For example, see PPL, p. 504; T396.
13 G III, p. 682.
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which is poor.’14 Despite the apparent risk to Remond’s health, Leibniz 
made no immediate attempt to produce the desired clarification or exposi-
tion of his system, and appears not to have made a start even by 11 July, 
when he wrote the following to Louis Bourguet:
Mr Remond, councillor of His Royal Highness the Duke of Orleans, thinks 
very highly of my Theodicy, and is asking me for clarifications. It would be 
easier for me to give them if difficulties, objections, comments or questions 
were raised about it, for without that passages are sometimes clarified in which 
others find no difficulties.15
The second thread to the Monadology begins on 17 February 1714: in a 
letter written to Leibniz on that date, Remond enclosed a Latin poem 
about Homer that had been composed by a friend, Abbé Fraguier. The 
poem evidently made an impact on Leibniz, who was inspired to compose 
one of his own, appending it to his letter to Remond of 14 March. Leibniz’s 
poem consists of sixty hexameters, almost a third of which are devoted to 
summarising some of his key doctrines; the ‘Leibnizian’ part of the poem 
begins with God, the ‘greatest author’, who scatters his rays onto the Earth 
and into the stars, creating minds in his image, as well as all souls, which 
enclose all things. Leibniz then claims that monads alone subsist, and the 
harmony between them is a testimony to God’s omnipotence; that the 
natural laws, fashioned in such a way that better ones cannot be imagined, 
are in harmony with final causes; and that atoms do not exist, and instead 
particles are divisible into ever smaller worlds, with nothing left empty. 
The Leibnizian part of the poem ends with the claim that God, the ruler of 
the best world, has arranged things in such a way that actions bring about 
their own punishments and rewards.16 In his next letter, written almost 
two months later, on 7 May, Remond began by telling Leibniz that both 
he and Fraguier were delighted by Leibniz’s Latin poem. It then became 
clear that he had discussed the possibility of Fraguier putting Leibniz’s 
philosophy into verse himself. However, as Remond explained,
Abbé Fraguier said to me just yesterday that he was not in fact sufficiently 
instructed in your system to dare to speak about it, but that if he ever were to 
have a clearer idea of it, it would be a pleasure to treat a subject so uncommon 
and grand.
Remond continued to explain Fraguier’s belief that poets had succeeded in 
treating ‘sensible things’ (that is, things of the senses), which were familiar 
14 Quoted in Enrico Pasini, ‘La monadologie: histoire de naissance’, in La Monadologie de 
Leibniz: genèse et contexte, ed. Enrico Pasini (Paris: Mimesis, 2005), pp. 101–2.
15 G III, pp. 571–2.
16 G III, pp. 613–15.
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to almost everyone, by making them even more sensible, but that they had 
struggled with more sublime matters which were not encountered through 
the senses. According to Fraguier, in order to treat such matters success-
fully, it would be necessary for the poet to have a mastery of the sublime 
material that was so thorough that he would be able to present it in verse 
as clearly as he could sensible things. Remond then related to Leibniz 
Fraguier’s view as to how a poet such as himself could acquire this mastery:
For that, he would have to have each proposition expressed with the utmost 
precision, without metaphor, and like the axioms of geometers; he would have 
to have the most immediate and most indirect consequences of these proposi-
tions, and he would have to use them to explain the passions and the natural 
effects. But I am some way from being in that position, and my mind furnishes 
me almost only with objections that I cannot resolve, because I do not yet 
know the points well enough. He [Fraguier] finally got me to agree that he 
had spoken fairly when he compared the knowledge we have of your system of 
monads to the knowledge that we would have of the sun just from single rays 
escaping from the clouds covering it.17
The two separate threads – Remond’s request for ‘clarification’ of monads, 
and Fraguier’s desire to have a systematic presentation of Leibniz’s phi-
losophy – were both discussed in Leibniz’s next letter to Remond, written 
in July 1714. He began the letter with this apology:
I hoped to enclose with this letter some clarification on monads that you appar-
ently requested, but it has grown under my hand, and many distractions have 
prevented me from finishing it already. And you know, Sir, that these sorts of 
considerations require contemplation.18
After discussing a variety of other matters, Leibniz ended the letter with a 
reference to Fraguier’s plan to put his philosophy into verse:
As Abbé Fraguier gives some relief to thoughts as mediocre as mine through 
verses of exceptional beauty, what would he not do if he treated an important 
subject and lofty matters? If through some clarifications I could contribute to 
encouraging him to implement the fine plan he apparently has, to give sub-
stance and colour to thoughts about the most sublime philosophy, I would 
have rendered a great service to mankind.19
17 G III, p. 616. Fraguier had in fact made a different but presumably related request of 
Leibniz the previous year, again through a third party. On 7 May 1713, Pierre Coste 
wrote to Leibniz to say that Fraguier ‘admires, as does his friend [Remond], everything 
that issues from your pen, and has charged me to implore you in his name to collect 
together in a single book all these loose pieces which have escaped from you at various 
times’. G III, p. 434.
18 G III, p. 618.
19 G III, p. 621.
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For his July 1714 letter to Remond, Leibniz had in fact composed a short 
appendix featuring a summary of his doctrine of monads (a full transla-
tion can be found in pp. 278–9 of this volume), but ultimately he did not 
enclose the appendix when sending the letter. Nevertheless, around this 
time Leibniz was crafting a much longer and more detailed ‘clarification’; 
this is the text we now know as the Monadology. Whether this was intended 
simply as the ‘clarification’ of the doctrine of monads that Remond had 
wanted, or as the basis for Fraguier’s projected poem, is unclear. Leibniz 
certainly seems to have conceived these as two distinct requests: the fact 
that he discussed one of them at the very start of his July 1714 letter to 
Remond, and the other at the very end, strongly suggests that he thought 
of them as unconnected. Nevertheless it is possible that the ‘clarifica-
tion’ that he put together was designed to serve both ends, since it has 
a style and structure not dissimilar to that which Fraguier had wanted. 
Whatever Leibniz had in mind, from the extant manuscripts it is clear 
that he devoted a great deal of time and energy to the text, but ultimately, 
for reasons at which we can only speculate, he decided not to send it to 
Remond. Instead, on 26 August 1714 Leibniz sent him a different work, 
the Principles of Nature and Grace, which had been written for Prince 
Eugene of Savoy.20 While Leibniz worked on both the Principles of Nature 
and Grace and the Monadology during the summer of 1714, the former was 
completed first, with the latter likely being completed only after Leibniz 
returned to Hanover, in mid-September of that year.21 Despite the work 
he had put into the Monadology, which included the addition of copious 
cross-references to his Theodicy for the benefit of any reader looking for 
a greater explanation of certain doctrines, Leibniz did not send it to the 
person for whom it had apparently been written, Remond, nor did he seek 
to publish it. Whatever the reason for this might have been – and again, 
we can do little more than speculate – Leibniz appears not to have been so 
dissatisfied with the text as to keep it from everyone, as he allowed certain 
of his confidantes in Vienna to have access to early drafts of the text.
Unlike most of the 50,000 or so writings that comprise Leibniz’s 
Nachlass, the Monadology was published relatively quickly after Leibniz’s 
death, at least in translation: although Leibniz had composed the piece 
20 Daniel Garber has suggested that Leibniz’s unsent appendix to his July 1714 letter to 
Remond ‘was probably the common ancestor of what was to become two finished essays, 
the “Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison,” and the “Monadologie.”’ 
Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 353.
21 See G. W. Leibniz, Principes de la nature et de la grace fondés en raison – Principes de la 
philosophie ou Monadologie, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1954), pp. 2, 12–13.
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in French (which by the dawn of the eighteenth century had overtaken 
Latin as the chief language of European scholarship), German and Latin 
translations appeared long before the original French was published. The 
Monadology was first published by Heinrich Köhler in 1720, in a German 
translation made not from Leibniz’s final draft but from an earlier one 
that Köhler may have obtained from Leibniz in person in the summer of 
1714.22 The title ‘Monadology’ was coined by Köhler. Leibniz seems not 
to have given the piece a title, though on one of the surviving manuscripts 
a copyist wrote ‘The principles of philosophy, by Mr Leibniz’; whether 
this title would have met with Leibniz’s approval is difficult to say, though 
its appropriateness is beyond question. ‘The principles of philosophy’ 
was used as the title of the Latin translation of the text that appeared in 
1721 in a supplement to the Acta eruditorum journal. The source used 
for this translation was a different early draft of the text, which is now 
lost.23 The Latin translation from the Acta eruditorum appeared in several 
other publications throughout the eighteenth century, most notably in 
a six-volume anthology of Leibniz’s writings edited by Ludovic Dutens 
in 1768.24 Each time, the title used was ‘The principles of philosophy’. 
The title by which we now know it, the Monadology, devised by Köhler 
in 1720, became popular only much later, following the first publication 
of the original French text in an anthology of Leibniz’s writings edited by 
Johann Eduard Erdman in 1840.25 For reasons that are not known, Erdman 
elected to use Köhler’s title ‘Monadology’, and in so doing he relegated 
‘The principles of philosophy’ to a mere subtitle. This decision caught the 
imagination of later editors of Leibniz’s works, such as Jacques (1842),26 
Janet (1866),27 and Gerhardt (1885),28 each of whom not only elected to use 
the title of ‘Monadology’ for the text, but also deemed it sufficient in itself, 
22 G. W. Leibniz, Lehr-Sätze über die Monadologie: ingleichen von Gott und seiner Existentz, 
seinen Eigenschaften und von der Seele des Menschen (1720). The copy of the Monadology 
from which Köhler made his translation is now lost. Evidently it consisted of ninety-two 
sections rather than the ninety found in all surviving manuscript copies of the text, but 
is otherwise very similar to one of the surviving early draft manuscripts.
23 ‘Principia philosophiæ, autore G. G. Leibnitio’, Acta eruditorum supplementa tomus VII 
(1721), pp. 500–14. The copy of the Monadology used for this translation consisted 
of ninety-three sections, but is otherwise similar to one of the surviving early draft 
manuscripts.
24 G. W. Leibniz, Opera omnia, ed. L. Dutens, 6 vols (Geneva, 1768), vol. 2, pp. 20–31.
25 G. W. Leibniz, Opera philosophica omnia, ed. J. E. Erdman (Berlin, 1840), pp. 702–12.
26 G. W. Leibniz, Oeuvres de Leibniz. Deuxième série, ed. A. Jacques, new edn (Paris: 
Charpentier, 1842), pp. 391–404.
27 G. W. Leibniz, Oeuvres philosophiques de Leibniz. Tome II, ed. Paul Janet (Paris: 
Ladrange, 1866), pp. 594–608.
28 G VI, pp. 607–22.
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thus omitting ‘The principles of philosophy’ altogether. Since Erdman, 
the text has become a staple in anthologies of Leibniz’s works, whether in 
the original language or in translation to another language, and the title of 
‘Monadology’ has stuck.
The Monadology was first translated into English in 1867 by Frederick 
Henry Hedge, who published his translation as an article in The Journal 
of Speculative Philosophy.29 This made the Monadology one of the first 
of Leibniz’s philosophical works to be available in English translation 
(although English-language anthologies of Leibniz’s philosophical writ-
ings are commonplace today, they only started to appear in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century). Today the number of different English transla-
tions of the text is almost into double figures: a translation of it is included 
in most English-language anthologies of Leibniz’s philosophical writings.30 
This reflects the fact that of all of Leibniz’s numerous philosophical works, 
the Monadology is often considered to be of particular importance, due in 
no small part to the wide range of doctrines discussed therein.
But as important as the Monadology is for the student of Leibniz, it is 
also a very condensed piece, and accordingly has gained a reputation as 
being one of Leibniz’s most difficult works. To address this, this volume 
contains not just the Monadology itself, but also a detailed section-by-
section commentary, designed to dispel the clouds of obscurity that hang 
over the text. The Monadology has long been seen as a work that benefits 
from a commentary: the first commentaries appeared in the nineteenth 
century,31 and have since been joined by others.32 As will become clear, in 
the commentary I have sought not just to clarify the claims Leibniz makes, 
but also identify his grounds and reasoning. This involves identifying his 
assumptions, detailing his arguments, and highlighting his inferences. In 
so doing, I remain neutral on the question of whether Leibniz wrote the 
Monadology for Fraguier, or according to the prescription laid down by 
Fraguier, which called for Leibniz to identify the axioms of his philosophy, 
to make apparent his conclusions and inferences, and so on. Nevertheless, 
29 F. H. Hedge, ‘The Monadology’, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1:3 (1867), 
pp. 129–37.
30 In addition to LPW, MPE, MPW, PPL, and PE, translations can be found in: The 
Philosophical Works of Leibnitz, 2nd edn, trans. and ed. George Martin Duncan 
(The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Company, 1908); Leibniz Selections, trans. and 
ed. Philip P.  Wiener (New York: Scribner, 1951); Philosophical Texts, trans. and ed. 
R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
31 Th. Desdouits, La Monadologie (Paris: Delalain, 1880); Alexis Bertrand, La Monadologie 
(Paris: Belin, 1886); MPW.
32 For example, Nicholas Rescher, G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology: An Edition for Students 
(London: Routledge, 1992).
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whether Leibniz wrote the Monadology with Fraguier in mind or not, the 
fact is that he did write it in a highly systematic way: ideas and doctrines 
are developed very precisely and explicitly connected together, and from 
them implications are drawn and inferences followed. The Monadology is 
not, to be sure, one long piece of deductive reasoning; while Leibniz does 
make many deductions, he also offers a posteriori arguments, makes appeals 
to the science of his day, and develops similes to make certain ideas easier 
to understand. Moreover, the Monadology is not written in the geometric 
manner, à la Spinoza’s Ethics: aside from utilising arguments based on 
experience, it lacks the formal apparatus of definitions, axioms, postulates, 
and so on, as well as a suite of rigorous demonstrations flowing from these. 
Yet even though Leibniz does not make use of this formal apparatus, 
throughout the Monadology he nevertheless does put forward defini-
tions, lay down axioms, make postulates, offer demonstrations, and so on. 
Moreover, long stretches of the Monadology consist of arguments and 
inferences, and Leibniz’s choice of language (for example, we find numer-
ous uses of phrases such as ‘for this reason’, ‘it follows that . . .’, ‘from 
this we see’, and so on) shows his systematic ambitions. The Structure of 
the Monadology (pp. 34–8 of this volume) shows the logical connection 
between sections and the flow of the argumentation across the text. It 
shows very clearly that in writing the Monadology Leibniz clearly wanted 
not just to summarise a number of his doctrines, but to make a case for 
them as well. In other words, he wanted the reader not just to understand 
what he believed, but also to be persuaded by it.33 We honour his wishes if 
we read it with that in mind.
33 This feature of the Monadology is sometimes overlooked, or played down. For example, 
Nicholas Jolley writes: ‘Some of the most famous brief expositions of his [Leibniz’s] 
thought, such as the Monadology and the Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), serve 
up his metaphysics in a “take it or leave it” manner; indeed, they even come close to 
dispensing with deductive argument altogether.’ Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (London: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 9. And Franklin Perkins writes, in a similar vein: ‘the Monadology 
and the Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason . . . were written near the end 
of his life and represent his philosophy in its most mature form. These works, though, 
are more like outlines than full arguments or explanations.’ Franklin Perkins, Leibniz: 
A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2007), p. 7.
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About the Text and Translation
Even with the benefit of a commentary, the Monadology is a difficult text to 
read in isolation. Leibniz himself appears to have been aware of this, for 
on one of his handwritten drafts of the piece he inserted at the end of some 
of the ninety sections various references to particular sections or pages of 
his book Theodicy (1710), so that a reader desiring further illumination 
would know where to find it. All of the passages from the Theodicy to which 
Leibniz refers can be found in the appendix to this volume. For ease of use, 
each passage from the Theodicy is keyed to the particular section(s) of the 
Monadology in which Leibniz refers to it. In addition, the appendix contains 
two further texts which shed light on the Monadology and its doctrines, namely:
• The Principles of Nature and Grace, which was written for Prince 
Eugene of Savoy around the same time as the Monadology, but com-
pleted first. While very similar (but not identical) in terms of doctrine, 
the two texts have a very different style: the Principles is written in a 
‘popular’ and accessible style, while the Monadology is more technical 
and formal, being aimed squarely at the ‘serious metaphysician’.1
• The ‘Appendix on Monads’, a brief clarification of his doctrine of 
monads that Leibniz wrote as a supplement to his letter to Nicole 
Remond of July 1714, but ultimately did not send.
The translations of the Monadology and of all of the texts in the appendix 
are my own. In translating the Monadology and the Principles of Nature and 
Grace I have used the text in André Robinet’s excellent edition, Principes 
de la nature et de la grace fondés en raison – Principes de la philosophie ou 
Monadologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954).
 1 The phrase is from Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, p. 353. 
